Too many goals: Problems with the 700Â MHz auction
AbstractIn early 2008, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted its largest auction of radio spectrum licenses. The auctioned 700Â MHz spectrum bands represented a large part of the US's digital dividend, which was created by transitioning to more efficient digital television broadcasts. The FCC set out to accomplish many laudable goals with the 700Â MHz auction such as promoting new entry and rural deployments in wireless broadband, creating a band of commercial spectrum with requirements for open access, and creating a nationwide interoperable public safety network. Unfortunately, poor 700Â MHz band license configurations and auction rules for their assignment prevented the FCC from meeting most of its goals. The two largest national wireless incumbents won most of the licensed frequencies so there will be no new national entrants, rural build-out is unlikely to be promoted, and the spectrum band set aside to aid the development of a public-private partnership for public safety is still unassigned. Furthermore, the large variation in prices within the auction does not support the notion that the auction assigned licenses efficiently.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Information Economics and Policy.
Volume (Year): 21 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505549
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- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011.
"Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages S167 - S188.
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Discussion Papers 10-015, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Rosston, Gregory L. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2010. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Working paper 48, Regulation2point0.
- Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2012. "Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services," Papers of Peter Cramton 11ckrs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
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