Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding and Firms’ Incentives to Collude
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 35 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
Collusion; Franchise bidding; Local public services; Yardstick competition; D42; D44; L50; L51;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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