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Collusion-Proof Yardstick Competition

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Author Info
Tangeras, T.P.

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Abstract

This paper analyses the incentives for collusion when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition. The central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private information are unable to communicate later.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 674.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:674

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Related research
Keywords: COMPETITION COLLUSION REGULATION

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. AURIOL, Emmanuelle & LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," IDEI Working Papers 20, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    Other versions:
  2. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cowan, Simon, 1997. "Competition in the Water Industry," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 83-92, Spring.
  4. LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques & MARTIMORT, David, 1998. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," IDEI Working Papers 81, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "Collusion and Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 280-305, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
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  8. Dag Morten Dalen, 1998. "Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 105-126, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Joel Sobel, 1999. "A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(1), pages 33-60, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Anna Bottasso & Maurizio Conti, 2003. "Cost Inefficiency in the English and Welsh Water Industry: An Heteroskedastic Stochastic Cost Frontier Approach," Economics Discussion Papers 573, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Georg Meran & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2006. "A Modified Yardstick Competition Mechanism," Working Papers 2006-05, Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Martine M. Bellanger & Philippe R. Mossé, 2005. "The search for the Holy Grail: combining decentralised planning and contracting mechanisms in the French health care system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(S1), pages S119-S132. [Downloadable!]
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