This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rothschild, R.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8P-3WH652K-5/2/21fe6fc1d52df42dfc63c84359ace195
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 17 (1999)
Issue (Month): 5 (July)
Pages: 717-734
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:17:y:1999:i:5:p:717-734

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Posada, P., 2000. "Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation: How Much Do the Size of the Cartel and the Size of the Industry Matter?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 556, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008. "Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry," MPRA Paper 11044, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2005. "Collusion Theory in Search of Robust Themes: A Comment on Switgard Feuerstein's Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 207-215, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Laurent Flochel & Bruno Versaevel, 2009. "Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint," Working Papers 0909, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2009. "A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 137-147, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of power," Discussion Paper 104, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. D. Dragone, 2008. "Should One Sell Domestic Firms to Foreign Ones? A Tale of Delegation, Acquisition and Collusion," Working Papers 623, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Markku Stenborg, 2004. "Forest for the Trees: Economics of Joint Dominance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 365-385, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Roberta Longo & Marisa Miraldo & Andrew Street, 2008. "Price regulation of pluralistic markets subject to provider collusion," Working Papers 045cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Markku Stenborg, 2002. "Economics of Joint Dominance," Discussion Papers 834, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ganslandt, Mattias & Persson, Lars & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2007. "Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy," Working Paper Series 719, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Ganslandt, Mattias & Persson, Lars & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2008. "Asymmetric Cartels - a Theory of Ring Leaders," CEPR Discussion Papers 6829, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Emilie Dargaud, 2007. "Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities," Working Papers 0708, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  14. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2004. "Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability," Working Papers 2004.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  15. Marc Escrihuela Villar, 2008. "A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion," DEA Working Papers 29, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada. [Downloadable!]
  16. Emilie Dargaud, 2008. "Mergers, cartels and leniency programs : the role of production capacities," Working Papers 0814, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.