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Informational efficiency of iterative processes and the size of message spaces

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  • Reiter, Stanley

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  • Reiter, Stanley, 1974. "Informational efficiency of iterative processes and the size of message spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 193-205, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:8:y:1974:i:2:p:193-205
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    1. Mount, Kenneth & Reiter, Stanley, 1974. "The informational size of message spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 161-192, June.
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    1. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
    2. Thierry Granger, 1997. "Le renouveau de la théorie des organisations. Lecture critique de trois ouvrages récents," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(1), pages 147-180.
    3. Edna Tusak Loehman & Richard Kiser & Stephen J. Rassenti, 2014. "Cost Share Adjustment Processes for Cooperative Group Decisions About Shared Goods: A Design Approach," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 1085-1126, September.
    4. , J. & ,, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.

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