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Designing Electricity Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Natalia Fabra () (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr () (University of Oslo)
David Harbord () (Market Analysis Ltd)
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Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids, and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. We also consider the relationship between market structure and market performance in the two auction formats. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=view&year=2006&issue=spr&page=23 .
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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 23-46
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:1:p:23-46Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.rje.org
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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"Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions ,"
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"The Fall in British Electricity Prices: Market Rules, Market Structure, or Both? ,"
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