Communication and efficiency in auctions
AbstractWe study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders report simultaneously. We also show that the seller who chooses how to allocate a fixed number of messages allocates them evenly over all agents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Mechanism design; Message space; Communication complexity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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