# Coarse matching with incomplete information

## Author Info

• Heidrun Hoppe
• Benny Moldovanu

()

• Emre Ozdenoren

## Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-009-0514-5

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

## Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 75-104

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:75-104

Contact details of provider:

Order Information:

## Related research

Keywords: Coarse matching; Incomplete information; C78; D42; D82;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

## References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
1. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
2. Spulber, Daniel F, 1992. "Optimal Nonlinear Pricing and Contingent Contracts," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(4), pages 747-72, November.
3. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 152, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
4. William P. Rogerson, 2003. "Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 919-926, June.
5. Neeman, Zvika, 2003. "The effectiveness of English auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 214-238, May.
6. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
7. Chao, Hung-po & Wilson, Robert, 1987. "Priority Service: Pricing, Investment, and Market Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 899-916, December.
8. R. Preston McAfee, 2002. "Coarse Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 2025-2034, September.
9. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2009. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 253-281.
10. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2007. "Price discrimination and efficient matching," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 243-263, February.
11. Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

## Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
1. Terence Johnson, 2009. "Matching Through Position Auctions," Working Papers 001, University of Notre Dame, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011.
2. Dirk Bergemann & Ji Shen & Yun Xu & Edmund M. Yeh, 2012. "Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1859, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
3. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2011. "Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Discussion Papers 1540, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
4. Johnson, T.R., 2013. "Matching through position auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1700-1713.
5. Christian Ewerhart, 2013. "Regular type distributions in mechanism design and $$\rho$$ -concavity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 591-603, August.
6. Condorelli, Daniele, 2012. "What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 613-624.

## Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

## Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:75-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.