Optimal Nonlinear Pricing and Contingent Contracts
AbstractNonlinear pricing is extended to allow for demand, cost, and capacity uncertainty. Incentive schedules are developed that implement the Pareto optimal allocation. Consumers choose a reference point, e.g., baseload demand. This determines both their payment level and the state-contingent output allocation. The approximate efficiency of alternative implementation procedures with discrete customer classes and with a linear prorated service rule is also examined. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 33 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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