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Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

Author

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  • Ali Hortaçsu
  • David McAdams

Abstract

Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (1) auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored search ads), (2) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds), and (3) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum licenses). This paper surveys recent developments in the empirical analysis of such auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali Hortaçsu & David McAdams, 2018. "Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 157-184, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:56:y:2018:i:1:p:157-84
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20160961
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peyman Khezr & Anne Cumpston, 2022. "A review of multiunit auctions with homogeneous goods," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 1225-1247, September.
    2. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
    3. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2019. "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1001-1031, December.
    4. De Keyser, Arne & Bart, Yakov & Gu, Xian & Liu, Stephanie Q. & Robinson, Stacey G. & Kannan, P.K., 2021. "Opportunities and challenges of using biometrics for business: Developing a research agenda," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 52-62.
    5. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    6. Shi, Yang & Zhao, Ying, 2019. "Modeling Advertisers' Willingness to Pay in TV Commercial Slot Auctions," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 120-133.
    7. Laséen, Stefan, 2023. "Central bank asset purchases: Insights from quantitative easing auctions of government bonds," Working Paper Series 419, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    8. Inaba, Kei-Ichiro, 2019. "The behaviour of bidders in quantitative-easing auctions of sovereign bonds in Japan: Determinants of the popularity of the 9 to 10-year maturity segment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 206-214.
    9. Edwyna Harris & Sumner La Croix, 2018. "Did Speculation in Land Pay Off for British Investors? Buying and Selecting Land in South Australia, 1835-1850," Working Papers 201809, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    10. Pallavi Pal, 2023. "Sponsored Search Auction and the Revenue- Maximizing Number of Ads per Page," CESifo Working Paper Series 10299, CESifo.
    11. Luo, Yao & Xiao, Ruli, 2023. "Identification of auction models using order statistics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 236(1).
    12. Estrella Alonso & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2020. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-26, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property

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