The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research in its series Discussion Papers with number 03-036.
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
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- Milgrom,Paul, 2004.
"Putting Auction Theory to Work,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, December.
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- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002.
"Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,"
02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
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- Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
- Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
- Steven R. Williams, 1999. "A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 155-180.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2005.
"Ascending Proxy Auctions,"
122247000000000785, UCLA Department of Economics.
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