This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
McCabe, Kevin A
Rassenti, Stephen J
Smith, Vernon L

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199012%2980%3A5%3C1276%3AAIDTAB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 80 (1990)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1276-83
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:5:p:1276-83

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Olson, Mark & Porter, David., 1991. "An Experimental Examination of the Assignment Problem," Working Papers 775, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Noussair, Charles & Porter, David., 1990. "Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 747, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alejandro Manelli & Martin Sefton & Benjamin Wilner, . "Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 2132867, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 200207, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Soo Chew & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2007. "Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 393-406, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jacinto Braga & Chris Starmer, 2005. "Preference Anomalies, Preference Elicitation and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 32(1), pages 55-89, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Murphy, James & Dinar, Ariel & Howitt, Richard & Mastrangelo, Erin & Rassenti, Stephen & Smith, Vernon, 2002. "Mechanisms For Addressing Third-Party Impacts Resulting From Voluntary Water Transfers," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19812, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  9. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Tanga McDaniel, 2002. "Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 520.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  10. J. Teich & H. Wallenius & J. Wallenius, 1998. "Multiple Issue Action and Market Algorithms for the World Wide Web," Working Papers ir98109, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  11. Peter Cramton, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.