Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
AbstractA number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 82 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Non-market mechanisms; Rationing; Mechanism design;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heidrun C. Hoppe & Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006.
"License Auctions and Market Structure,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 371-396, 06.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 2530, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Condorelli, Daniele, 2012. "What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 613-624.
- Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-19, July.
- Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
- Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2007.
"Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 37-58, Summer.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2006. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000629, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2006. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets," NBER Working Papers 12702, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roth, Alvin, 2007. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets," Scholarly Articles 2624677, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale & Jinwoo Kim, 2013. "Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 73-107.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004.
"Putting Auction Theory to Work,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, October.
- Paul Klemperer, 2004.
"Auctions: Theory and Practice,"
Online economics textbooks,
SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1, January.
- Paul Klemperer, 2004.
"Introduction to Auctions: Theory and Practice
[Auctions: Theory and Practice]," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
- McMillan, John, 1995. "Why auction the spectrum?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-199, April.
- Eric Budish, 2011. "The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1061 - 1103.
- Pai, Mallesh M. & Vohra, Rakesh, 2014. "Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 383-425.
- repec:dgr:kubcen:2013078 is not listed on IDEAS
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.