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Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition

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Author Info
Ian Ayres ()
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

In recent auctions for paging licenses, the Federal Communications Commission has granted businesses owned by minorities and women substantial bidding credits. In this article, Professors Ayres and Cramton analyze a particular auction and argue that the affirmative action bidding preferences, by increasing competition among auction participants, increased the government's revenue by $45 million. Subsidizing the participation of new bidders can induce established bidders to bid more aggressively. The authors conclude that this revenue- enhancing effect does not provide a sufficient constitutional justification for affirmative action-but when such justification is independently present, affirmative actions can cost the government much less than is currently thought.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/96slr-deficit-reduction-through-diversity.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 96slr.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision: 09 Jun 1998
Publication status: Published in Stanford Law Review, 48:4, April 1996, pages 761-815.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:96slr

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions Affirmative Action

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marja Appelman & Joeri Gorter & Mark Lijesen & Sander Onderstal & Richard Venniker, . "Equal rules or equal opportunities? Demystifying level playing field," CPB Documents 34, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  2. Allan Corns & Andrew Schotter, 1999. "Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. John McMillan, 2003. "Market Design: The Policy Uses of Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 139-144, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-5.


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