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The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

From July 1994 to July 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted nine spectrum auctions, raising about $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. The auctions assigned thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Were the auctions efficient? Did they award the licenses to the firms best able to turn the spectrum into valuable services for onsumers? There is substantial evidence that the FCC's simultaneous ascending auction worked well. It raised large revenues. It revealed critical information in the process of bidding and gave bidders the flexibility to adjust strategies in response to new information. As a result, similar licenses sold for similar prices, and bidders were able to piece together sensible sets of licenses.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/98jle-efficiency-of-the-fcc-spectrum-auctions.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 98jlefcc.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jul 1998
Date of revision: 27 Jul 1998
Publication status: Published in Journal of Law and Economics, 41:2, October 1998, pages 727-736.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jlefcc

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions Multiple-Item Auctions Spectrum Auctions

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
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  4. Ballard, Charles L & Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1985. "General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 128-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Bykowsky, Mark M. & Cull, Robert J. & Ledyard, John O., 1995. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Working Papers 916, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Onderstal, S., 2002. "The chopstick auction," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lawrence White, 2000. ""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin," Working Papers 00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrés Pereyra, 2001. "Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0302, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tomomi Tanaka, 2005. "Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation," Experimental 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
  6. Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Matejka, M. & Onderstal, S. & De Waegenaere, A., 2002. "The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Lawrence J. White, 2006. "The Fishery as a Watery Commons: Lessons from the Experiences of Other Public Policy Areas for US Fisheries Policy," Working Papers 06-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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