Economics at the Federal Communications Commission
AbstractThis article reviews several issues confronted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the past year and discusses some of the economic analysis employed by the FCC in examining these issues. The article also identifies areas in which future academic research would be valuable to the agency. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
a la carte; multichannel video programming; net neutrality; spectrum auctions;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
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- Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2001. "Collusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities- An Experimental Test," Working Papers 200102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
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- Gregory Crawford & Evan Kwerel & Jonathan Levy, 2008. "Economics at the FCC: 2007–2008," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 187-210, November.
- Bajari, Patrick & Yeo, Jungwon, 2009. "Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 90-100, June.
- David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray, . "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S," Working Papers 10-64, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray, 2011. "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 25-43, Winter.
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