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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

Volume (Year): 6 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Pages: 529-548
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:6:y:1997:i:3:p:529-548

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