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Art experts and auctions Are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?

Author

Listed:
  • Luc BAUWENS

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • Victor GINSBURGH

    (Université Libre de Bruxelles)

Abstract

Public sales art catalogues include low and high pre-sale price estimates by experts. This makes it possible to analyze whether pre-sale estimates are unbiased predictors of realized prices. Unbiasedness is tested using a sample of some 1,600 lots of English silver auctioned by Christie's and Sotheby's. Results show that estimates are slightly (but significantly) baised and that experts do not use ail the information that is available to them when they make their estimates.

Suggested Citation

  • Luc BAUWENS & Victor GINSBURGH, 2000. "Art experts and auctions Are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2000022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Biasedness of pre-sale estimates; not fully informative pre-sale estimates;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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