Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots
AbstractAn analysis of competition for scarce inputs, describing the outcome of an auction of takeoff and landing slots between two airline carriers and the possible outcomes from a merger or takeover wave. The results suggest that the concern over monopolization of airports may be misplaced.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its journal Economic Review.
Volume (Year): (1994)
Issue (Month): Q II ()
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Krishna, K., 1990.
"Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited,"
472, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Krishna, Kala, 1993. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 147-60, March.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
- Severin Borenstein, 1992.
"The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 45-73, Spring.
- repec:att:wimass:9318 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yvan Lengwiler, 1999.
"The multiple unit auction with variable supply,"
Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lee Faulhaber).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.