Market Design: The Policy Uses of Theory
AbstractThe use of modern microeconomics in policy is illustrated by the markets for spectrum, electricity, greenhouse-gas reductions, defense procurement, and Treasury bills. Further examples are antitrust divestiture rules, market-based redistribution, fishery conservation, and privatization. The limits of the use of theory are also discussed, by reference to China's economy-wide reforms. Lessons on the policy use of theory are drawn.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 93 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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