Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors
AbstractWe examine how owners of productive resources (e.g. public enterprises or financial capital) optimally allocate their resources among wealth-constrained operators of unknown ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise profit--the resource owner always shares the operator's profit; (2) dispersed enterprise ownership--resources are widely distributed among operators of varying ability; (3) limited benefits of competition--the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource; and, sometimes (4) diluted incentives for the most capable--more capable operators receive smaller shares of the returns they generate. Implications for privatizations and venture capital arrangements are explored.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 90 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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