Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 50 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
- Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, 1994.
"Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 334-347, Summer.
- Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, 1993. "Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints," NBER Working Papers 4526, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Holtz-Eakin, D. & Joulfaian, D. & Rosen, H.S., 1992. "Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints," Papers 129, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
- Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & BRUCE C. PETERSEN, 1988.
"Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991.
"Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Game Theory and Information
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Liu, Shulin & Wang, Mingxi, 2010. "Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 1-3, April.
- Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh Vohra, 2008. "Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 245-257, December.
- Eric Maskin, 2001. "Auctions and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Kai Konrad, 2012.
"Information alliances in contests with budget limits,"
Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-21, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Zheng, Charles Z., 2001.
"High Bids and Broke Winners,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 129-171, September.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014.
"Advances in Auctions,"
1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- William Stein & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 309-328, September.
- Eisenhuth, Roland, 2010. "Auction Design with Loss Averse Bidders: The Optimality of All Pay Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 23357, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2005. "Optimal Auctions for Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1419, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 2000. "Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 944-960, September.
- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1162, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2008.
"An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
08-017/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2011. "An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 11/04, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2002. "Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 215-236, May.
- Thomas, Lionel, 2002. "Non-linear pricing with budget constraint," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 257-263, April.
- Maskin, Eric S., 2000. "Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 667-681, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.