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Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

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Author Info
Che, Yeon-Koo
Gale, Ian

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-3VVVRRT-11/2/652f499eca1817ff61336320bc94f213
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 50 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 373-379
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:50:y:1996:i:3:p:373-379

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  1. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Auctions and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh Vohra, 2008. "Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 245-257, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Lugovskyy, Volodymry, 2003. "A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1162, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alexey Malakhov & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2005. "Optimal Auctions for Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1419, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2000. "Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 944-960, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2008. "An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-017/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  7. William Stein & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 309-328, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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