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All-pay auctions with risk-averse players

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  • Gadi Fibich

    ()

  • Arieh Gavious

    ()

  • Aner Sela

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0034-5
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 583-599

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:4:p:583-599

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Related research

Keywords: Private-value auctions; Risk aversion; Perturbation analysis; D44; D72; D82;

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References

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  1. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  2. Péter Esö & Lucy White, 2004. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 77-92, 01.
  3. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Kaplan, Todd, et al, 2002. "All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 417-30, December.
  5. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
  6. Fibich, Gadi & Gavious, Arieh & Sela, Aner, 2004. "Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 309-321, April.
  7. Yasar Barut & Dan Kovenock & Charles N. Noussair, 2002. "A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 675-708, August.
  8. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Loukas Balafoutas & Glenn Dutcher & Florian Lindner & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2012. "The optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents," Working Papers 2012-08, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  2. Hyndman, Kyle & Ozbay, Erkut Y. & Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut, 2012. "Rent seeking with regretful agents: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 866-878.
  3. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Charity Auctions: A Field Experimental Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 1330, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2012. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests," Working Papers 600, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Eisenhuth, Roland, 2010. "Auction Design with Loss Averse Bidders: The Optimality of All Pay Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 23357, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Christiane Ernst & Christian Thöni, 2013. "Bimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 608-623, October.
  7. Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making," CESifo Working Paper Series 4330, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious, 2010. "Large auctions with risk-averse bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 359-390, July.
  9. Parreiras, Sérgio O. & Rubinchik, Anna, 2010. "Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 703-715, March.

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