Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Competition for procurement shares

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alcalde, Jose
  • Dahm, Matthias

Abstract

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32078/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32078.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 07 Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32078

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Procurement Auction; Armative Action;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Morgan, GR, 1995. "Optimal fisheries quota allocation under a transferable quota (TQ) management system," Marine Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 379-390, September.
  2. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1998. "Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 98-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  3. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
  4. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2010. "Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests," IZA Discussion Papers 5158, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Maxim Boycko & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Privatizing Russia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 139-192.
  6. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1210, Econometric Society.
  7. Martin K. Perry & JÛzsef S·kovics, 2003. "Auctions for Split-Award Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 215-242, 06.
  8. Harry Holzer & David Neumark, 1999. "Assessing Affirmative Action," NBER Working Papers 7323, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Grether, David M. & Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R., . "The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 350, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Elena Krasnokutskaya & Katja Seim, 2011. "Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2653-86, October.
  11. Charles C.L. Kwong & Wai Chung (Harry) Lo, 2006. "Guest Editors' Introduction," Chinese Economy, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 39(4), pages 3-9, August.
  12. Andrew Schotter & Allan Corns, 1999. "Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March.
  13. repec:sae:ecolab:v:16:y:2006:i:2:p:1-2 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 101-124, September.
  15. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
  16. Alcalde, Jose & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution," MPRA Paper 22306, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  18. Corchon, Luis C, 2000. " On the Allocative Effects of Rent Seeking," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 483-91.
  19. Véronique Flambard & Isabelle Perrigne, 2006. "Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Snow Removal Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 1014-1036, October.
  20. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  21. Ilan Kremer & Kjell G. Nyborg, 2004. "Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 147-159, Spring.
  22. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Hubbard, Timothy P. & Paarsch, Harry J., 2009. "Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-14, January.
  24. Andrew Yates, 2011. "Winner-pay contests," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 93-106, April.
  25. Anton, James J. & Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2010. "Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 24-41, May.
  26. Ewerhart, Christian & Fieseler, Karsten, 2003. " Procurement Auctions and Unit-Price Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 569-81, Autumn.
  27. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-51, November.
  28. Roman Inderst, 2008. "Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 199-213.
  29. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64.
  30. Gong, Jiong & Li, Jianpei & McAfee, R. Preston, 2012. "Split-award contracts with investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 188-197.
  31. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 1989. "Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 538-552, Winter.
  32. Marion, Justin, 2007. "Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1591-1624, August.
  33. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
  34. Michael H. Rothkopf & Ronald M. Harstad & Yuhong Fu, 2003. "Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 49(1), pages 71-84, January.
  35. Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 127-147, January.
  36. Elena Krasnokutskaya, 2011. "Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 293-327.
  37. Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996. "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton 96slr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  38. F.M. Scherer, 2007. "An industrial organization perspective on the influenza vaccine shortage," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4-5), pages 393-405.
  39. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, October.
  40. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
  41. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1992. "Coordination in Split Award Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 681-707, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Matthias Dahm & Patricia Esteve, . "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2014-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32078. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.