Competition for procurement shares
AbstractWe propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 80 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Procurement auction; Affirmative action;
Other versions of this item:
- Alcalde, Jose & Dahm, Matthias, 2011. "Competition for procurement shares," MPRA Paper 32078, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alcalde, José & Matthias, Dahm, 2011. "Competition for Procurement Shares," QM&ET Working Papers 11-3, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
- Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2011. "Competition for Procurement Shares," Working Papers 2072/169682, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
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