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Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions

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Author Info
Corns, Allan
Schotter, Andrew

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9383/RR96-02.PDF
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 96-02.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-02

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research
Keywords: Affirmative action; auctions; experiments;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996. "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton 96slr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
  5. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  6. Timothy Cason & Daniel Friedman, 1999. "Learning in a Laboratory Market with Random Supply and Demand," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 77-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "The Amsterdam Auction," Microeconomics 0205002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. James T. Swarthout & Jason Shachat, 2004. "Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 629, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. J. Todd Swarthout & Jason Shachat, 2004. "The performance of reverse auctions versus request for quotes when procuring goods with quality differences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 255, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Tim C. Salmon, 2008. "Individual Behavior In Auctions with Price Proportional Benefits," Working Papers wp2008_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2006. "Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying," Working Papers 200619, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations," IZA Discussion Papers 823, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Richard B. Freeman, 2006. "Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament," NBER Working Papers 12588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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