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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 86-21.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:86-21

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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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1. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1994. "Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result," Working Paper 9402, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
2. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information 9805001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1999. [Downloadable!]
3. Roberto Burguet & R. Preston McAfee, 2008. "License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 745.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roberto Burguet & R. McAfee, 2009. "License prices for financially constrained firms," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 178-198, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Kala Krishna, 1990. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations, The Snowball Effect Revisited," NBER Working Papers 3483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kala Krishna, 1999. "Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 377-391. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Masili, Gustavo, 2006. "Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders," MPRA Paper 2134, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
6. Banks, Jeffrey & Camerer, Colin & Porter, David., 1990. "An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games," Working Papers 740, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Banks Jeffrey & Camerer Colin & Porter David, 1994. "An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-31, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-342, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Carolyn Pitchik, 2006. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-230, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Carolyn Pitchik, 1989. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 201, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
8. Peter Cramton, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
9. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2008. "An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-017/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
10. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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