Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints
AbstractWe study a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. The players have either decreasing or increasing marginal values for the prizes, which are commonly known, and there is a constraint on the total effort that each player can exert in both stages. We analyze the players' allocations of efforts along both stages when the budget constraints (effort constraints) are either restrictive, nonrestrictive or partially restrictive. We show that when the players are either symmetric or asymmetric and the budget constraints are restrictive, independent of the players' values for the prizes, each player allocates his effort equally along both stages of the contest.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8383.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-04 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alexander Matros, 2006. "Elimination Tournaments where Players Have Fixed Resources," Working Papers 205, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2009.
"Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints,"
Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 105-124, January.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2005. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-13, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Arieh Gavious & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2002.
"Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 709-722, Winter.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2003.
"Bidding in hierarchies,"
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance
SP II 2003-27, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998.
"Caps on Political Lobbying,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
- Alex Robson, 2005. "Multi-Item Contests," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-446, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2008.
"Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1211, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2008. "Is the 50-state strategy optimal?," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-16, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 2008.
"Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information,"
tecipa-342, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 2006. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-230, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 1989. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 201, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Morgan, John, 2003. " Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
- Rick Harbaugh & Tilman Klumpp, 2005.
"Early Round Upsets and Championship Blowouts,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 316-329, April.
- Warneryd, Karl, 1998.
"Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September.
- Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2008. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 113-142, 03.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu & Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Yang, 2007.
"Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 213-239, May.
- J. Atsu Amegashie & C. Bram Cadsby & Yang Song, 2005. "Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0507, University of Guelph, Department of Economics.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1997. " Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 109-26, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.