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Sequential Contests With Synergy And Budget Constraints

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  • Aner Sela

    ()
    (BGU)

  • Reut Megidish

    (BGU)

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    Abstract

    We study a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. The players have either decreasing or increasing marginal values for the prizes, which are commonly known, and there is a con- straint on the total effort that each player can exert in both stages. We analyze the players' allocations of efforts along both stages when the budget constraints (effort constraints) are either restrictive, non- restrictive or partially restrictive. In particular, we show that when the players are either symmetric or asymmetric and the budget constraints are restrictive, independent of the players'values for the prizes, each player allocates his effort equally along both stages of the contest.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1212.

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    Length: 29 pages
    Date of creation: 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1212

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    Related research

    Keywords: Sequential contests; Tullock contests; budget constrains.;

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    References

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    1. Arieh Gavious & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2002. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 709-722, Winter.
    2. Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Bidding in hierarchies," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-27, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    3. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2008. "Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1211, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    4. Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009. "Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
    5. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Elimination Tournaments where Players Have Fixed Resources," Working Papers 205, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
    6. Rick Harbaugh & Tilman Klumpp, 2004. "Early Round Upsets and Championship Blowouts," Working Papers 2004-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
    8. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Yang, 2007. "Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 213-239, May.
    9. Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August.
    10. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2008. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 113-142, 03.
    11. Warneryd, Karl, 1998. "Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September.
    12. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2009. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 105-124, January.
    13. Carolyn Pitchik & Andrew Schotter, 1988. "Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 363-388, Autumn.
    14. Morgan, John, 2003. " Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
    15. Alex Robson, 2005. "Multi-Item Contests," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-446, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    16. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1997. " Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 109-26, July.
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