Sequential Contests With Synergy And Budget Constraints
AbstractWe study a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. The players have either decreasing or increasing marginal values for the prizes, which are commonly known, and there is a con- straint on the total effort that each player can exert in both stages. We analyze the players' allocations of efforts along both stages when the budget constraints (effort constraints) are either restrictive, non- restrictive or partially restrictive. In particular, we show that when the players are either symmetric or asymmetric and the budget constraints are restrictive, independent of the players'values for the prizes, each player allocates his effort equally along both stages of the contest.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1212.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Sequential contests; Tullock contests; budget constrains.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arieh Gavious & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2002.
"Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 709-722, Winter.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2003.
"Bidding in hierarchies,"
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance
SP II 2003-27, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2008.
"Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1211, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2008. "Is the 50-state strategy optimal?," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-16, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Pitchik, Carolyn, 2009.
"Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 928-949, July.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-342, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 2006. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-230, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Carolyn Pitchik, 1989. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 201, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Alexander Matros, 2006. "Elimination Tournaments where Players Have Fixed Resources," Working Papers 205, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
- Rick Harbaugh & Tilman Klumpp, 2004.
"Early Round Upsets and Championship Blowouts,"
2004-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998.
"Caps on Political Lobbying,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu & Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Yang, 2007.
"Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 213-239, May.
- J. Atsu Amegashie & C. Bram Cadsby & Yang Song, 2005. "Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0507, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2008. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 113-142, 03.
- Warneryd, Karl, 1998.
"Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September.
- Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2009.
"Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints,"
Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 105-124, January.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2005. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-13, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Carolyn Pitchik & Andrew Schotter, 1988. "Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 363-388, Autumn.
- Morgan, John, 2003. " Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July.
- Alex Robson, 2005. "Multi-Item Contests," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-446, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1997. " Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 109-26, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Aamer Abu-Qarn).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.