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Un modèle d'estimation de la valeur des lots de bois à partir de résultats d'enchères avec invendus

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  • Raphaële Préget
  • Patrick Waelbroeck

Abstract

Timber stumpage appraisal is an important issue for Public Forest Services so as to set a relevant reserve price and to obtain a fair market value. The hedonic price function approach is a useful method to infer the appraisal timber value given that many characteristics may influence the stumpage price. We adopt the transaction-evidence timber appraisal method using a data set including timber auctions. An econometric problem arises from the fact that a large number of lots remain unsold at the end of the sales. In addition, the seller reserve price is not announced in French timber auctions. We study the variables that determine the probability that a lot will be sold or not and the implicit prices of the characteristics of the lots. We correct the bias due to the existence of unsold lots using the sample selection model of Heckman. Classification JEL : D44, C24, L73, Q23

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaële Préget & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2006. "Un modèle d'estimation de la valeur des lots de bois à partir de résultats d'enchères avec invendus," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 593-603.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0593
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    1. Ashenfelter, Orley & Genesove, David, 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 501-505, May.
    2. D. M. Prescott & G. D. Puttock, 1990. "Hedonic Price Functions for Multi-product Timber Sales in Southern Ontario," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 38(2), pages 333-344, July.
    3. Ginsburgh, V. & van Ours, J.C., 2003. "How to Organize Sequential Auctions : Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's," Other publications TiSEM 01ec6d80-7501-441c-a60b-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, 1997. "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 544-565, Autumn.
    5. Horstmann, Ignatius J & LaCasse, Chantale, 1997. "Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Resale Option," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 663-684, September.
    6. Bernard Elyakime & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrice Loisel & Quang Vuong, 1994. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 71-114.
    7. Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
    8. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:04 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Puttock, G. David & Prescott, D.M. & Meilke, Karl D., 1989. "Stumpage Prices In Southwestern Ontario: A Hedonic Function Approach," Working Papers 123573, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    10. Neil Gandal, 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 227-244, September.
    11. Gandal, Neil, 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 227-244, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
    2. Dossè Mawussi DJAHINI-AFAWOUBO, 2023. "Niveau d’éducation et probabilité d’être employé dans le secteur informel au Togo," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 57, pages 29-48.
    3. Elyakime, B. & Cabanettes, A., 2009. "How to improve the marketing of timber in France?," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 169-173, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
    • L73 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Forest Products
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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