• NEP-ALL-2001-06-08 (All new papers)

1. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Steven A. Matthews, 1981. "Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes," Discussion Papers 480S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Dutra, Joísa Campanher, 2001. "Hybrid Auctions I: Theory," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 421, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
2. Roberto Burguet, 2000. "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Burguet, R., 1998. "Auction Theory: a Guided Tour," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 422.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
3. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
4. Albert Choi, 2004. "A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 759, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
5. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA. [Downloadable!]
6. Robert Gérin-Lajoie & Yves Richelle & Jacques Robert, 2000. "Appels d'Offres et Enchères Ouvertes : Enjeux de Design et Propositions," CIRANO Project Reports 2000rp-09, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
7. Aron, Janine & Elbadawi, Ibrahim, 1994. "Foreign exchange auction markets in sub-Saharan Africa : dynamic models for auction exchange rates," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1396, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
8. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2005. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Discussion Papers 0506-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types," MPRA Paper 6102, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2005. "Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 784828000000000012, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 95-118, March. [Downloadable!]
9. Elmar WOLFSTETTER, . "Auctions-An Introduction," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1994-13, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
   Other versions:
   • Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996. " Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
10. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "In-House Competition, Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Charles D. Kolstad Rolando M. Guzman, . "Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 17-97, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Rolando Guzman & Charles Kolstad, 1997. "Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp17-97, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]