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Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions

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  • Menezes, Flavio Marques
  • Monteiro, Paulo Klinger

Abstract

This paper considers sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). The authors show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) in its series Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) with number 360.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgewp:360

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References

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  1. repec:wop:humbsf:1998-62 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Jones, C. & Menezes, F. & Vella, F., 1996. "Auctions Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics 303, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  3. Ashenfelter, O. & Genesove, D., 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real Estate Auctions," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 92-2, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November.
  5. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February.
  6. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1998. "Scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1998,62, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  7. Black, Jane & De Meza, David, 1992. "Systematic Price Differences between Successive Auctions Are No Anomaly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(4), pages 607-28, Winter.
  8. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1994. "A Note on Sequential Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 653-57, June.
  9. Fl. Menezes & P.K.Monteiro, 1994. "Sequential Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation," Microeconomics, EconWPA 9402001, EconWPA, revised 09 Jun 1994.
  10. Gandal, Neil, 1997. "Sequential Auctions of Interdependent Objects: Israeli Cable Television Licenses," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 227-44, September.
  11. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
  12. Vanderporten, Bruce, 1992. "Timing of Bids at Pooled Real Estate Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 255-67, September.
  13. Vanderporten, Bruce, 1992. "Strategic behavior in pooled condominium auctions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 123-137, January.
  14. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Indranil Chakraborty, 2004. "Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, AccessEcon, vol. 4(8), pages 1-14.
  2. Reiss, J. Philipp & Schöndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
  4. Xiaoshu Xu & Dan Levin & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Auctions with synergy and resale," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 397-426, May.
  5. Stuart Kells, 2003. "Explaining The Breadth Of Expert Estimate Ranges In Auctions Of Rare Books," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 873, The University of Melbourne.
  6. Das Varma, Gopal, 2003. "Bidding for a process innovation under alternative modes of competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 15-37, January.
  7. Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement," Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, Department of Economics 27, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:8:p:1-14 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2004. "Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 287-294, November.
  10. Rosato, Antonio, 2014. "Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect"," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 56824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Veronika Grimm, 2004. "On Procurement Auctions Of Complementary Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2004-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Tang Sorensen, Soren, 2006. "Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 337-342, June.

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