1. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Steven A. Matthews, 1981. "Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes," Discussion Papers 480S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Dutra, Joísa Campanher, 2001. "Hybrid Auctions I: Theory," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 421, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
2. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA. [Downloadable!]
3. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "In-House Competition, Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Roberto Burguet, 2000. "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Burguet, R., 1998. "Auction Theory: a Guided Tour," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 422.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
5. Albert Choi, 2004. "A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 759, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
6. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2005. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Discussion Papers 0506-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types," MPRA Paper 6102, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2005. "Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 784828000000000012, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 95-118, March. [Downloadable!]
7. Charles D. Kolstad Rolando M. Guzman, . "Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 17-97, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Rolando Guzman & Charles Kolstad, 1997. "Auction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp17-97, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
8. Robert Gérin-Lajoie & Yves Richelle & Jacques Robert, 2000. "Appels d'Offres et Enchères Ouvertes : Enjeux de Design et Propositions," CIRANO Project Reports 2000rp-09, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
9. Aron, Janine & Elbadawi, Ibrahim, 1994. "Foreign exchange auction markets in sub-Saharan Africa : dynamic models for auction exchange rates," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1396, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
10. Elmar WOLFSTETTER, . "Auctions-An Introduction," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1994-13, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
    Other versions:
    • Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996. " Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
11. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]