Sequential auction and auction design
AbstractOften an auction designer has the option of selling, or purchasing, those lots available in one auction or a sequence of auctions. In addition, bidder opportunities will not be static, in part due to arrival of information, but also because bidders can face deadlines for making decisions. This paper examines the optimal decision about how to divide what is available over time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30022.
Date of creation: 04 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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