Asking Prices as Commitment Devices
AbstractThis paper explores the implications of the hypothesis that an asking price is a ceiling to which a seller commits in order to provide incentives for potential buyers to incur search costs. Having attracted such a potential buyer, the seller must also determine how low to set the floor price, below which it is preferable to wait for another customer. This decision is affected by expectations about the characteristics of future buyers, which are, in turn, affected by the asking price. All of this is embedded in models of monopoly and of duopolistic competition. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 42.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
More information through EDIRC
prices ; contracts;
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Richard Arnott & Paul Anglin, 1995.
"Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
302., Boston College Department of Economics.
- Paul Anglin & Richard Arnott, 1999. "Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 719-749.
- Arnott, R. & Anglin, P., 1995. "Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a21, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Albrecht, James & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan, 2010.
"Directed Search in the Housing Market,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7639, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Susan Vroman & Pieter Gautier & James Albrecht, 2007. "Directed Search in the Housing Market," 2007 Meeting Papers 372, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Albrecht, James & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2009. "Directed Search in the Housing Market," IZA Discussion Papers 4671, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1577-1597, August.
- Benjamin Lester & Ludo Visschers & Ronald Wolthoff, 2013.
"Competing with asking prices,"
13-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Lester, Benjamin R. & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2013. "Competing with Asking Prices," IZA Discussion Papers 7163, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Benjamin Lester & Ludo Visschers & Ronald Wolthoff, 2013. "Competing with Asking Prices," Working Papers tecipa-471, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Inami, Yusuke, 2011. "The buy price in auctions with discrete type distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-11, January.
- David Gill & John Thanassoulis, 2013. "Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining," Economics Series Working Papers 639, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Antonio Merlo & François Ortalo-Magné, 2002. "Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England (Third Version)," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2002.
- Antonio M. Merlo & François Ortalo-Magné, 2002.
"Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
778, CESifo Group Munich.
- Merlo, Antonio & Ortalo-Magne, Francois, 2004. "Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 192-216, September.
- François Ortalo-Magné & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bargaining over Residential Real Estate: Evidence from England," Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers 02-02, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research.
- Elliot Anenberg, 2012. "Information frictions and housing market dynamics," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-48, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Paul E. Carrillo, 2005. "Assessing the Value of On-line Information Using a Two-sided Equilibrium Search Model in the Real Estate Market," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 307, Society for Computational Economics.
- Michael Sandfort & Hideo Konishi, 2000.
"Expanding Demand through Price Advertisement,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
453, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2001.
- Gill, David & Thanassoulis, John, 2009. "The impact of bargaining on markets with price takers: Too many bargainers spoil the broth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 658-674, August.
- Anenberg, Elliot, 2011. "Loss aversion, equity constraints and seller behavior in the real estate market," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 67-76, January.
- Selcuk, Cemil, 2012. "Motivated Sellers & Predatory Buyers," MPRA Paper 36226, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Charles Ka Yui Leung & Youngman Chun Fai Leong & Ida Yin Sze Chan, 2002. "TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough?," International Real Estate Review, Asian Real Estate Society, vol. 5(1), pages 91-115.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.