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Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm

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Author Info
Riordan, M.H.

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Abstract

Backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise. The dominant firm's cost advantage may or may not offset the negative effect to higher prices on social welfare. Whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration. A vertical merger is equivalent to a hypothetical horizontal merger, suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry structure should be similar to horizontal merger policy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 64.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:64

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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Related research
Keywords: COMPETITION; PRICING; ENTREPRISES; MERGERS;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2003. "On The Competitive Effects Of Vertical Integration Under Product Differentiation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-31, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  2. Ali Hortacsu & Chad Syverson, 2006. "Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices," Working Papers 06-21, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hans-Theo Normann, 2004. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure in the Repeated Game," Industrial Organization 0408008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Simon Loertscher, 2008. "Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(22), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  5. Juan Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2005. "Welfare-Enhancing Collusion in the Presence of a Competitive Fringe," Documentos de Trabajo 298, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Simon Loertscher & Markus Reisinger, 2009. "Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 278, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Häckner, Jonas, 2001. "Vertical Integration and Competition Policy," Research Papers in Economics 2001:1, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  8. Noriaki Matsushima & Tomomichi Mizuno, 2009. "Vertical Separation as a Defense against Strong Suppliers," ISER Discussion Paper 0755, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey MacIntosh, 2000. "The Determinants of R & D Expenditures: A Study of the Canadian Biotechnology Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 357-370, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Yongmin Chen, 2000. "On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0383, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_30, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, 1999. "Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 7112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, 1998. "Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 6701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," Working Papers 0212, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Augusto Rupérez Micola & Albert Banal Estañol & Derek W. Bunn, 2006. "Incentives and Coordination in Vertically Related Energy Markets," CIG Working Papers SP II 2006-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Michael H. Riordan, 2005. "Competitive effects of vertical integration," Discussion Papers 0506-11, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. repec:bep:theadv:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1164-1164 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
  19. Andrea Bonaccorsi & Paola Giuri, 2000. "The long term evolution of vertically-related industries," LEM Papers Series 2000/01, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Downstream Investment in Oligopoly," Working Papers 0310, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Strategic R and D investments with uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(1), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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