Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm
AbstractBackward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise. The dominant firm's cost advantage may or may not offset the negative effect to higher prices on social welfare. Whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration. A vertical merger is equivalent to a hypothetical horizontal merger, suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry structure should be similar to horizontal merger policy.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 64.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
More information through EDIRC
COMPETITION; PRICING; ENTREPRISES; MERGERS;
Other versions of this item:
- Riordan, Michael H, 1998. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1232-48, December.
- Michael Riordan, 1996. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," Papers 0064, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.