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Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers

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  • Ching-to Albert Ma

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 0084.

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Date of creation: Dec 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:0084

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Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Phone: 617-353-4389
Fax: 617-353-444
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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Cited by:
  1. Philippe Chone & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2007. "Optimal Health Care Contracts under Physician Agency," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-041, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2007.
  2. Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May.
  3. Francisco J. Gomes & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Luis M. Viceira, 2007. "The Excess Burden of Government Indecision," NBER Working Papers 12859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Philippe Choné & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2004. "Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency : Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity," Working Papers 2004-37, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  5. Sonja Ossig & Eberhard Feess, 2004. "The impact of liability for malpractice on the optimal reimbursement schemes for health services," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 396, Econometric Society.
  6. Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja, 2007. "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 423-441, December.

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