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The Excess Burden of Government Indecision

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Author Info

  • Laurence J. Kotlikoff

    ()
    (Boston University and NBER)

  • Francisco J. Gomes

    ()
    (London Business School and CEPR)

  • Luis M. Viceira

    ()
    (Harvard Business School)

Abstract

Governments are known for procrastinating when it comes to resolving painful policy problems. Whatever the political motives for waiting to decide, procrastination distorts economic decisions relative to what would arise with early policy resolution. In so doing, it engenders excess burden. This paper posits, calibrates, and simulates a life cycle model with earnings, lifespan, investment return, and future policy uncertainty. It then measures the excess burden from delayed resolution of policy uncertainty. The first uncertain policy we consider concerns the level of future Social Security benefits. Specifically, we examine how an agent would respond to learning in advance whether she will experience a major Social Security benefit cut starting at age 65. We show that having to wait to learn materially a¤ects consumption, saving, labor supply, and portfolio decisions. It also reduces welfare. Indeed, we show that the excess burden of government indecision can, in this instance, range as high as 0.6 percent of the agent?s economic resources. This is a significant distortion in of itself. Its also significant when compared to other distortions measured in the literature. The second uncertain policy we consider concerns marginal tax rates. We obtain similar results once we adjust for the impact of tax rates on income.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2010-014.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2010-014

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Pástor, Luboš & Veronesi, Pietro, 2011. "Political Uncertainty and Risk Premia," CEPR Discussion Papers 8601, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Pietro Veronesi & Lubos Pastor, 2011. "Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices," 2011 Meeting Papers 86, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. repec:cge:warwcg:46 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Alex Armstrong & Nick Draper & André Nibbelink & Ed Westerhout, 2007. "Fiscal prefunding in response to demographic uncertainty," CPB Discussion Paper 85, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  5. Laurence Kotlikoff & Ben Marx & Pietro Rizza, 2006. "Americans' Dependency on Social Security," Working Papers wp126, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
  6. Siciliani, Luigi, 2007. "Paying for Performance with Altruistic or Motivated Providers," CEPR Discussion Papers 6452, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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