This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Information asymmetry and search in the market for physicians' services

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rochaix, Lise
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8K-458WM07-3/2/7449c0ec9cf71b0355e45e208f46470b
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 53-84
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:8:y:1989:i:1:p:53-84

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Martin Gaynor, 1995. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Francisco J. Gomes & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Luis M. Viceira, 2007. "The Excess Burden Of Government Indecision," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-004, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Kris De Jaegher & Marc Jegers, 2001. "The physician-patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(7), pages 651-668. [Downloadable!]
  4. Paul Calcott, 1999. "Demand inducement as cheap talk," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(8), pages 721-733.
  5. Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2002. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-06, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Christian M. Ernst, 2003. "The interaction between cost-management and learning for major surgical procedures - lessons from asymmetric information," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 199-215. [Downloadable!]
  7. Philippe Chone & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2007. "Optimal Health Care Contracts under Physician Agency," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-041, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
  8. Lucien Gardiol & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Chantal Grandchamp, 2003. "Separating Selection and Incentive Effects: an Econometric Study of Swiss Health Insurance Claims Data," DELTA Working Papers 2003-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  9. Darren Grant, 2005. "Information and sorting in the market for obstetrical services," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(7), pages 703-719. [Downloadable!]
  10. F. Barigozzi & R. Levaggi, 2005. "New Developments in Physician Agency: the Role of Patient Information," Working Papers 550, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.