Environmental Regulation and Labor demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin
AbstractThe devolved nature of environmental regulation provides an excellent opportunity for estimating the effects of regulation on employment, by generating rich variation in regulation across regions and over time. We exploit this variation using direct measures of regulation and plant data. We estimate the employment effects of an unprecendent increase in air quality regulation in the Los Angeles region, using unregulated plants in other regions, industries and years for comparison.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 82.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
More information through EDIRC
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ; REGULATION ; EMPLOYMENT;
Other versions of this item:
- Berman, Eli & Bui, Linda T. M., 2001. "Environmental regulation and labor demand: evidence from the South Coast Air Basin," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 265-295, February.
- Eli Berman & Linda T. Bui, 1997. "Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin," Papers 0082, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bartel, Ann P & Thomas, Lacy Glenn, 1987. "Predation through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Effects of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 239-64, October.
- Adam B. Jaffe et al., 1995. "Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 132-163, March.
- Vernon Henderson, 1995.
"Effects of Air Quality Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
5118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gray, Wayne B, 1987. "The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA and the Productivity Slowdown," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 998-1006, December.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Rational Debate About California's Environmental Regulation?
by Matthew E. Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2011-01-02 17:33:00
- My OP-ED Piece about California's Anti-Carbon Legislation
by Matthew Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2012-08-16 15:30:00
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