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Value of communication in agencies

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Melumad, Nahum D.
Reichelstein, Stefan

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 334-368
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:47:y:1989:i:2:p:334-368

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  2. William P. Rogerson, 2003. "Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 919-926, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. William P. Rogerson, 1987. "On the Optimality of Menus of Linear Contracts," Discussion Papers 714, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Suren Basov, 2006. "Non-monotone Incentives in a Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 979, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998. "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 119-172, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Suren Basov & Peter Bardsley, 2005. "A General Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 958, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  7. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Hans Frimor & Brian Mittendorf, 2006. "On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives," European Accounting Review, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 311-324, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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