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Value of communication in agencies

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  • Melumad, Nahum D.
  • Reichelstein, Stefan

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 47 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 334-368

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:47:y:1989:i:2:p:334-368

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Cited by:
  1. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  2. Oliver Fabel & Dominique Demougin, 2004. "The Division of Ownership in New Ventures," Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor 04-03, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim.
  3. Vagstad, S., 2000. "Centralized vs. Decentralized procurement: does Dispersed Information Call for Decentralized Decision-Making?," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 211, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  4. Gick, Wolfgang, 2008. "Delegated contracting, information, and internal control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 179-183, December.
  5. Alexander Monge-Naranjo & Javier Cascante & Luis J. Hall, 2001. "Enforcement, Contract Design, and Default: Exploring the Financial Markets of Costa Rica," Research Department Publications 3126, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November.
  7. Forder, Julien, 1997. "Contracts and purchaser-provider relationships in community care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 517-542, October.
  8. Pfeiffer, Thomas & Schneider, Georg, 2010. "How to elicit sequential retailer information optimally," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 147-159, March.
  9. William Novshek & Lynda Thoman, 1993. "Agency in a market setting," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 225-253, October.
  10. Barrachina Palanca, Mercedes & Ripoll, Vicente & Gago Rodríguez, Susana, 2004. "Social research evolution in management accounting : reflection using Bunge’s theory," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/7366, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  11. Hempelmann, Bernd, 2006. "Optimal franchise contracts with private cost information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 449-465, March.
  12. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
  13. William P. Rogerson, 1987. "On the Optimality of Menus of Linear Contracts," Discussion Papers 714, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Suren Basov & Peter Bardsley, 2005. "A General Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 958, The University of Melbourne.
  15. El Bouhadi, Abdelhamid, 2006. "Contrat de travail et précarisation : une modélisation de l’information asymétrique d’une situation atypique, cas des pays pauvres et en développement
    [Employment contract and insecurity jo
    ," MPRA Paper 19859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. William P. Rogerson, 2003. "Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 919-926, June.
  17. Suren Basov, 2006. "Non-monotone Incentives in a Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 979, The University of Melbourne.
  18. Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998. "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 119-172, January.
  19. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Hans Frimor & Brian Mittendorf, 2006. "On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives," European Accounting Review, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 311-324.

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