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On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection

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  • Picard Pierre

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 8602.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8602

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Cited by:
  1. Theilen, Bernd, 2003. "Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 283-289, May.
  2. Zou, L., 1989. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Discussion Paper 1989-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Adeyemi Esuola & Michael Hoy & Zahirul Islam & Calum G. Turvey, 2007. "Evaluating the effects of asymmetric information in a model of crop insurance," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 341-356, September.
  4. Dan Anderberg, 1999. "Adverse selection, competition, and linear self-insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 3-15, Spring.
  5. G. Dionne & C. Vanasse, 1997. "Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l'assurance automobile (1992) au Québec," THEMA Working Papers 97-22, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco, 1992. "Environmental innovation policy and international competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 183-200, March.
  7. Suren Basov, 2006. "Non-monotone Incentives in a Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 979, The University of Melbourne.
  8. Arthur Selender & Liang Zou, 1994. "Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: on the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 149-166, June.
  9. G. Dionne & M. Maurice & J. Pinquet & C. Vanasse, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard : Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2001-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  10. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.
  11. Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & Rollins, Kimberly S., 2001. "Private Resource Management And Public Trust: Optimal Resource Conservation Contracts Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 34141, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  12. Suren Basov & Peter Bardsley, 2005. "A General Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 958, The University of Melbourne.

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