Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection

Contents:

Author Info

  • Picard Pierre

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 8602.

as in new window
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8602

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
Phone: +33(0) 1 43 13 62 30
Fax: +33(0) 1 43 13 62 32
Web page: http://www.cepremap.fr/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & Rollins, Kimberly S., 2001. "Private Resource Management And Public Trust: Optimal Resource Conservation Contracts Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics 34141, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  2. Zou, L., 1989. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1989-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Arthur Selender & Liang Zou, 1994. "Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: on the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 149-166, June.
  4. Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2013. "Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 4279, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.
  6. Dionne, Georges & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 47-80, mars-juin.
  7. Alain Trannoy & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2014. "Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France 1416, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised 02 Apr 2014.
  8. G. Dionne & M. Maurice & J. Pinquet & C. Vanasse, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard : Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 2001-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  9. Adeyemi Esuola & Michael Hoy & Zahirul Islam & Calum G. Turvey, 2007. "Evaluating the effects of asymmetric information in a model of crop insurance," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 341-356, September.
  10. Suren Basov, 2006. "Non-monotone Incentives in a Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 979, The University of Melbourne.
  11. Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco, 1992. "Environmental innovation policy and international competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 183-200, March.
  12. Dan Anderberg, 1999. "Adverse selection, competition, and linear self-insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 3-15, Spring.
  13. Suren Basov & Peter Bardsley, 2005. "A General Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 958, The University of Melbourne.
  14. Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2014. "Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Working Papers, HAL halshs-00993124, HAL.
  15. Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2013. "Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 377-404.
  16. Theilen, Bernd, 2003. "Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 283-289, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8602. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sébastien Villemot).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.