Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of symmetric and asymmetric taxation on performance-based versus fixed remuneration contracts. I integrate a proportional corporation tax and a proportional wage tax into a binary principal-agent model. The wage tax increases the remuneration costs and makes the agent's employment less attractive. Thus, the principal tends to demand lower rather than higher effort or does not offer a contract at all. In contrast to the wage tax, the corporate tax is irrelevant for the optimal remuneration contract. Under asymmetric corporate taxation, the principal tends to offer contracts less frequently. Fixed remuneration contracts are penalized more heavily by asymmetric taxation than performance-based remuneration contracts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3363.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
asymmetric taxation; loss-offset; principal-agent theory; corporate taxation; wage taxation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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