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The No Loss Offset Provision and the Attitude Towards Risk of a Risk-Neutral Firm

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Author Info

  • Eeckhoudt, L.
  • Gollier, C.
  • Schlesinger, H.

Abstract

In this paper, we show how a differentiated tax treatment of corporate losses and corporate profits induces the firm to behave in a very specific risk-averse manner.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 96.409.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:96.409

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Web page: http://www-gremaq.univ-tlse1.fr/
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Keywords: ECONOMETRICS; RISK; TAXES;

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References

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  1. Gollier Christian, 1995. "The Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk Revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 522-535, August.
  2. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
  3. Uzi Segal & Avia Spivak, 1988. "First Order Versus Second Order Risk Aversion," UCLA Economics Working Papers 540, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Sandmo, Agnar, 1971. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 65-73, March.
  5. Leland, Hayne E, 1972. "Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 278-91, June.
  6. Baron, David P, 1970. "Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 11(3), pages 463-80, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Farsi, Mehdi, 2010. "Risk aversion and willingness to pay for energy efficient systems in rental apartments," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 3078-3088, June.
  2. Sureth, Caren & Voß, Armin, 2005. "Investitionsbereitschaft und zeitliche Indifferenz bei Realinvestitionen unter Unsicherheit und Steuern," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 2, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  3. Daniel Dreßler & Michael Overesch, 2013. "Investment impact of tax loss treatment—empirical insights from a panel of multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 513-543, June.
  4. Marcel Gérard & Joann Martens Weiner, 2006. "Comment la compensation internationale des pertes et la répartition proportionnelle des revenus imposables peuvent affecter les choix des multinationales et la concurrence fiscale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 173(2), pages 65-77.
  5. Niemann, Rainer, 2007. "Risikoübernahme, Arbeitsanreiz und differenzierende Besteuerung," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 28, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  6. Ralf Ewert & Rainer Niemann, 2010. "Limited Liability, Asymmetric Taxation, and Risk Taking - Why Partial Tax Neutralities can be Harmful," CESifo Working Paper Series 3301, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Andreas Haufler & Mohammed Mardan, 2013. "Cross-Border Loss Offset Can Fuel Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 4089, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Henri LOUBERGE & Harris SCHLESINGER, 1999. "Optimal Catastrophe Insurance with Multiple Catastrophes," FAME Research Paper Series rp7, International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering.
  9. Marcel Gérard & Joann Weiner, 2003. "Cross-Border Loss Offset and Formulary Apportionment: How do they affect multijurisdictional firm investment spending and interjurisdictional tax competition ?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1004, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Rainer Niemann, 2011. "Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incentive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3363, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Gollier, Christian, 2007. "The Determinants of the Insurance Demand by Firms," IDEI Working Papers 468, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  12. Niemann, Rainer, 2003. "Wie schädlich ist die Mindestbesteuerung? Steuerparadoxa in der Verlustrechnung," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 259, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
  13. Caren Sureth & Ralf Maiterth, 2008. "The impact of minimum taxation by an imputable wealth tax on capital budgeting and business strategy of German companies," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 81-110, July.
  14. Rainer Niemann, 2004. "Asymmetric Taxation and Cross-Border Investment Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1219, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Niemann, Rainer, 2004. "Entscheidungswirkungen von Verlustverrechnungsbeschränkungen bei der Steuerplanung grenzüberschreitender Investitionen," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 276, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.

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