Regulation of Multiagent Research and Development
AbstractThis article focuses on the regulation problems raised by two specific characteristics of research and development: first, it is normally desirable that several units pursue the same goal, and second, that only the best of the final products made by these units is worthwhile to society. When firms have private information, these characteristics are seen to generate a substitution effect which in some situations implies that the resources allocated to R&D under asymmetric information are excessive relative to the full-information allocation. I thus identify asymmetric information as one possible source of excessive allocations to research and development.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 24 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Wallace HUFFMAN & Richard E. JUST, 1995. "Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research," Staff Papers 277, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
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