Monopoly versus R&D-Integrated Duopoly
AbstractIn the standard two-stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture, using two well-known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. According to the model with a wider scope of application, monopoly always leads to a higher propensity for R&D and, when R&D costs are low, to the best overall market performance. The results also allow for a comparison between the two underlying models of strategic R&D. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Manchester in its journal Manchester School.
Volume (Year): 70 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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