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research articles : Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers

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Author Info
Jim Jin () (Department of Economics, The Queen's University of Belfast, Belfast, BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland, UK)
Rabah Amir () (Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 5230 Odense M, DENMARK)
Madjid Amir (Department of Statistics and Operations Research, King Saud University, P.O.Box 2455, Riyadh 11451, SAUDI ARABIA)

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Abstract

We compare simultaneous versus sequential moves in R&D decisions within an asymmetric R&D/Cournot model with linear demand (for differentiated products), general R&D costs, and spillovers. Simultaneous play and sequential play (with and without a specified leader) can emerge as appropriate formulations, depending on the ratios of spillover rate over demand cross-slope, but not on R&D efficiency. When at least one ratio is above 1/2, a sequential solution mitigates competition and leads to higher profits for each firm, and to higher social welfare. When uniquely specified, the stronger firm emerges as the R&D first-mover.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 297-317
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:2:p:297-317

Note: Received: December 8, 1997; revised version: October 25, 1998
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Related research
Keywords: R&D spillovers; Cournot duopoly; Subgame-perfect Equilibrium; Endogenous timing.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - General

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