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Competition and Networks of Collaboration

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  • Roketskiy, Nikita

Abstract

I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination. They value collaboration with others and higher tournament rankings. I use von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets as a solution. I find stable networks in which agents collaborate only within exclusive groups. Both absence of intergroup collaboration and excessive intragroup collaboration lead to inefficiency. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of efficient outcomes in winner-takes-all tournaments. I show that the use of transfers does not repair efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Roketskiy, Nikita, 2017. "Competition and Networks of Collaboration," CEPR Discussion Papers 12194, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12194
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Marinucci & Wouter Vergote, 2011. "Endogenous Network Formation in Patent Contests And Its Role as A Barrier to Entry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 529-551, December.
    2. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256.
    3. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
    4. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mauleon, Ana & Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2023. "R&D network formation with myopic and farsighted firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 203-229.
    2. Chenghong Luo & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2021. "Network formation with myopic and farsighted players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1283-1317, June.
    3. Ana Mauleon & Jose J. Sempere-Monerris & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Limited Farsightedness in R &D Network Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 549-565, June.
    4. N. Roketskiy, 2012. "Farsightedly Stable Matchings," Working Papers 12-26, NET Institute.
    5. Luo, Chenghong & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2022. "Friendship networks with farsighted agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2022021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks; Tournaments;

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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