A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
AbstractIn this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be Ã¬resting pointsÃ® for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 95 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 248, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, . "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," IEW - Working Papers 238, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 656.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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