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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

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  • Salvador Barberà
  • Anke Gerber

Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 248.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:248

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Related research

Keywords: Hedonic Game; Coalition Formation; Stability;

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References

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  1. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.
  2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, . "Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games," Economics Working Papers, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus 2000-12, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  4. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
  5. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Fehr, Ernst & Singer, Tania, 2005. "The Neuroconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5128, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez, 2006. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/11, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  3. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2010. "Bargaining cum Voice," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2005. "The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 1625, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Eric Weese, 2013. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations," Working Papers, Economic Growth Center, Yale University 1022, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  6. Casajus, André, 2008. "On the stability of coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 271-274, August.
  7. Weese, Eric, 2013. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations," Working Papers, Yale University, Department of Economics 113, Yale University, Department of Economics.
  8. Eric Weese, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Working Papers, Economic Growth Center, Yale University 997, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  9. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Dynamic stable set," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics 33, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "One-deviation principle in coalition formation," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics 35, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  11. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
  12. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundation of Trust and Social Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.

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